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The rapid advance and global spread of biotechnology and the life sciences promise enormous 
benefits for public health and opportunities for promoting sustainable economic development. At the 
same time, these trends are exacerbating the risk that biotechnology might accidentally, 
inadvertently, or deliberately be used in ways that cause harm. Because of the global diffusion of the 
life sciences, global approaches are needed to reduce these risks while securing the benefits of 
biotechnology.  
Yet efforts to advance global action face significant political and economic challenges, including 
differences in national priorities and capabilities and concerns about policy actions that might 
threaten national sovereignty. In the United States, bioterrorism remains a primary concern. But in 
most developing countries, primary concernsare the risks to human and animal health and well-
being from natural disease outbreaks exacerbated by inadequate public health and agricultural 
resources, capacity, and infrastructure. Developing countries do not want counter-bioterrorism 
initiatives to impede or divert resources from efforts to strengthen public health and agriculture. 
The challenge of reducing biological risks is also complicated by the increasing importance of the 
private sector and academia in biotechnology and the life sciences. Engaging these non-State actors 
is critical, but many participants in industry and academia do not fully appreciate the potential risks 
associated with their work. Limited oversight and transparency heighten uncertainty about private-
sector products and practices. Greater involvement, interaction and communication among these 
and many other stakeholders are key to effectively addressing 21st century biological threats. New 
partnerships and cooperative international security mechanisms, built on the normative and legal 
foundations of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the International Health Regulations 
2005 (IHR 2005), must be established.  
In recent years, the U.S. government has strengthened its national preparedness and response 
capabilities for catastrophic disease events, including bioterrorism. But it has paid inadequate 
attention to prevention and response measures internationally, thereby increasing our vulnerability to 
a significant biological event and heightening the skepticism of other countries about our 
commitment to either improving global public health or reducing deliberate and accidental biological 
risks to global security.  
The Obama Administration can change course, correct this deficit, and take strong action to reduce 
biological risks to security.  To this end, the United States should: 
• Pursue multilateral efforts to establish internationally harmonized standards for pathogen and 
laboratory safety and security and to provide technical and financial assistance to developing 
countries to facilitate their adoption, sustainable implementation, and enforcement of national 
measures for the safety and security of biological agents; 
• Pursue bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts to strengthen national criminal legislation 
and law enforcement capabilities for detecting, interdicting, investigating and prosecuting 
biological crimes, and promote international legal and technical cooperation towards these 
ends;  
• Support efforts to strengthen the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigating 
allegations of biological weapons use and to establish a capability to investigate alleged 
breaches of BWC obligations if the Security Council determines that investigation is 
warranted; 
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• Pursue stronger confidence-building and other transparency measures designed to provide 
mutual reassurance that national biodefense and other dual-use activities comply with the 
BWC; 
• Strengthen cooperative efforts to improve national, regional, and multinational surveillance 
and response capabilities with respect to outbreaks of infectious diseases, whether naturally 
occurring or man-made; and 
• Support the development of international mechanisms that enhance the coordination and 
implementation of biological threat reduction policies. 
To create coherence in the face of competing priorities, a careful balance must be maintained 
among policy attention to intentional biological threats, to accidents, and to naturally occurring 
infectious diseases. Although the initiatives proposed here focus primarily on deliberate, inadvertent, 
and accidental disease threats, they aim wherever possible to generate synergies with efforts to 
counter naturally occurring infectious diseases and to promote global biotechnology development. 
However, these initiatives will achieve only limited results if the United States does not make a 
serious and sustained commitment to addressing broader global public health concerns. U.S. 
capacity-building assistance must help recipient states meet their social and economic needs and 
support recipient states’ ownership of their own capacity development.  
In the coming years, U.S. pursuit of its bio-risk reduction objectives will take place in a world of 
increasing multipolarity and deepening fiscal and economic challenges. These trends and 
challenges make the task of achieving greater security for the United States more difficult. They also 
highlight the need, and provide opportunities, for our nation to renew its commitment to productive 
global partnerships and engagement.  
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PATHOGEN AND LABORATORY SECURITY 
Recommendation 1: Pursue multilateral efforts to establish internationally harmonized 
standards for pathogen and laboratory safety and security and to provide technical and 
financial assistance to developing countries to facilitate their adoption, sustainable 
implementation, and enforcement of national measures for the safety and security of 
biological agents. 
The Problem 
Pathogen and laboratory security refers to measures for preventing the theft, diversion, or misuse of 
dangerous pathogens and toxins.  These include measures for the physical protection, control and 
monitoring of dangerous biological materials; the vetting of persons with access to them; the tracking 
of their possession and transfer; and the oversight of high-consequence research involving them. In 
addition to helping prevent unauthorized access to these materials, security measures can inform 
national authorities about legitimate holdings and high-risk activities, help prevent dual-use research 
from having destructive consequences, help authorities identify suspicious or negligent activities, 
and enable them to impose criminal sanctions against illicit activities.  
Effective biosafety measures, which are taken to prevent harm from accidental exposure to or 
release of biological agents, are essential for effective pathogen and laboratory security. Together, 
safety and security measures provide a comprehensive approach for managing and reducing risks 
associated with the possession, handling and use of biological agents. However, gaps and 
inconsistencies remain in national and multilateral systems for pathogen and laboratory safety and 
security. Divergent interests and priorities (e.g., bioterrorism vs. naturally occurring infectious 
diseases) complicate the challenge of building effective, sustainable and internationally harmonized 
systems. 
Review and Assessment of Current Efforts 
After 9/11 and the anthrax letter attacks, the U.S. government tightened controls on access to 
pathogens and toxins that could significantly threaten human, animal or plant health if used as 
weapons. Yet, as illustrated by numerous incidents and reports in the United States, significant gaps 
remain in both biosafety and pathogen and laboratory security measures. The Commission on the 
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism recently recommended that the U.S. government 
take steps to improve pathogen and laboratory safety and security both at home and abroad.  
Indeed, relatively few countries have implemented strong pathogen and laboratory security and 
biosafety measures, even though work with dangerous pathogens and toxins is expanding rapidly.  
Many countries lack even basic safety and security regulations. International organizations, such as 
the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have issued guidelines and 
conducted workshops on laboratory biosafety and/or pathogen security. However, many nations lack 
the means to give priority to implementing and enforcing them, or simply have failed to do so. The 
adoption and implementation of security-related guidelines in particular remain incomplete.   
Through the Defense Department’s Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) and the State 
Department’s Global Threat Reduction Program (GTRP), the United States has provided financial 
and technical assistance to improve safety and security at biological facilities in countries of the 
former Soviet Union. The State Department has recently initiated similar activities in other regions 
through the Biosecurity Engagement Program.  
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However, these efforts are poorly coordinated and insufficiently resourced to reach many parts of the 
world, especially sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, these programs face challenges fostering 
ownership by recipient states of their own capacity development, as well as challenges aligning U.S. 
security goals with recipient states’ urgent public health, agricultural and biotechnology capacity-
building needs and priorities. These problems reduce program effectiveness and the likelihood of 
generating sustainable improvements. 
Policy Recommendations 
Every country that permits peaceful uses of dangerous pathogens and toxins should implement 
effective and legally binding measures for their safe and secure storage, handling, use, and transfer. 
Such measures could include: 
• Readily updatable lists of pathogens and toxins subject to safety and security regulation;  
• National registries of laboratories, culture collections and other facilities that possess these 
agents; 
• Legal prohibitions on unregistered possession, handling, use and transfer of certain agents; 
• Laboratory risk assessment methods to ensure that the level of security is commensurate 
with the level of risk;  
• Provisions for risk assessment and oversight of high-consequence life sciences research;  
• Training, standards and infrastructure for ensuring the physical security, safe handling, and 
appropriate use of dangerous materials, as well as for access control and materials 
monitoring and accounting;  
• Personnel reliability measures, including vetting;  
• Regulations for the safe and secure transport of dangerous pathogens and toxins;  
• Record-keeping and reporting requirements for transfers of biological agents, applicable to 
both suppliers and recipients; and 
• Reporting requirements and emergency response plans for safety or security breaches. 
These measures will necessarily vary from country to country given the variety of dangerous 
pathogens and toxins, of facilities that work with them, of carriers that transport them, and of local 
and national conditions. However, to minimize gaps and inconsistencies among national 
approaches, they should be based on internationally harmonized standards and guidelines, and 
should apply to all facilities that hold dangerous pathogens and toxins, all scientists and other 
personnel who have access to them, and all transportation modes that convey them.  
At home, every relevant U.S. government agency should coordinate its oversight functions for 
biosafety and pathogen and laboratory security. Means should be established to ensure consistent 
promulgation and implementation of national biosafety and pathogen and laboratory security 
measures. 
Internationally, the United States should pursue multilateral efforts to develop internationally 
harmonized standards and guidelines and to promote their implementation. One approach would be 
for the United States to support the establishment of a multilateral Technical Working Group (TWG), 
under the auspices of the UN or the BWC and involving leading international scientific organizations 
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such as the WHO, which would develop a set of internationally harmonized security standards that 
complement and supplement existing biosafety guidelines.  
Controls are also needed on international transfers of dangerous agents. The TWG could work with 
the World Customs Organization and others to develop harmonized standards and guidelines for 
tracking and reporting international transfers of biological agents to national authorities and for end-
user verification, as well as an international system for monitoring such transfers. 
Whether promoting a TWG or comparable international approach, the United States should 
encourage States to enact domestic legislation and implement and enforce subsidiary regulations.  
Positive incentives, training programs, transparency, and information exchange measures may be 
effective ways to provide such encouragement.   
For some States, the costs of implementing pathogen and laboratory security measures and their 
lack of technical knowledge and infrastructure will be disincentives, and these countries will prefer to 
direct their limited financial and human resources towards higher national priorities.  To address this 
problem, the United States should expand its biological threat reduction programs globally, and 
should align its efforts more closely with the needs, priorities, and implementation strategies of 
recipient nations. For example, donor-funded, partner-led efforts to help developing countries meet 
their IHR 2005 obligations and advance their national health needs, including greater scientific 
collaboration and exchange, could provide a foundation on which to strengthen biosafety and 
pathogen and laboratory security. The United States should also improve coordination, both across 
U.S. government agencies and with other donor nations, in order to achieve the most efficient use of 
available resources.  
  
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Recommendation 2: Pursue bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts to strengthen national 
criminal legislation and law enforcement capabilities for detecting, interdicting, investigating 
and prosecuting biological crimes and promote international legal and technical cooperation 
towards these ends.  
The Problem 
Law enforcement officials should be authorized and able to detect, investigate, and interdict actual 
and planned biological crimes and terrorist attacks. They should also be able to identify, apprehend 
and prosecute perpetrators.  
Today, however, many countries lack comprehensive criminal legislation to prohibit and assign 
penalties for (1) the acquisition, development, production, transfer, or use of biological agents, 
equipment, and means of delivery with intent to cause harm; and (2) unauthorized access to or use 
of laboratories or possession of critical biological agents. Crafting such legislation is complicated by 
the need to ensure that legitimate activities involving dangerous biological agents are permitted.  
Many countries also lack sufficient capacity to collect evidence, develop early-warning systems, 
coordinate among relevant agencies, train law enforcement personnel, or provide necessary 
scientific and technological support for investigating and prosecuting biological crimes. These 
problems are often compounded by a general lack of investigatory and other law enforcement 
capabilities with respect to ordinary criminal activities. Thus, efforts to help these countries 
strengthen their law enforcement capabilities with respect to preventing and responding to biological 
crimes should also contribute to improving their overall law enforcement capabilities. 
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Finally, systems to ensure international cooperation in arresting, extraditing, and prosecuting 
persons who develop, produce or use biological weapons are also inadequate.  The international 
community lacks agreed procedures for investigating and resolving biological crimes that have 
transnational implications, including procedures for gathering and analyzing evidence and for 
sharing information. This problem could be especially serious in connection with an ongoing series 
of biological attacks when prompt identification and apprehension of perpetrators would be critical. 
Review and Assessment of Current Efforts 
In 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), which requires that all 
UN Member States (1) adopt and enforce prohibitions against non-State actors developing, 
acquiring, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery 
for terrorist purposes; and (2) establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such 
weapons and their means of delivery.  UNSCR 1540 established the 1540 Committee to monitor and 
assist State compliance.  Although the mandate of the 1540 Committee was extended in May 2008, 
initial hopes that the resolution would spur States to take vigorous national measures to prevent 
biological crimes have not been fulfilled.   
The United States has promoted policies to strengthen national legislation relevant to the goals of 
UNSCR 1540 and the BWC.  The United States has also supported the Interpol Bioterrorism 
Prevention Program to help developing countries strengthen their national criminal legislation and to 
raise police awareness of biological threats through workshops, train-the-trainer programs, and 
response guides. However, in most countries, law enforcers remain insufficiently authorized, trained 
or equipped to carry out necessary tasks. Efforts to address this situation are complicated because 
most countries have scarce resources to confront other serious and more urgent law enforcement 
challenges (e.g. organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, and other forms of terrorism).  
Policy Recommendations 
Ideally, every nation should have strong criminal legislation against the preparation for and 
perpetration of biological crimes.  Law enforcers should be educated about laws relevant to illicit 
biological activities, and about intelligence, investigative, forensic, prosecutorial, and ethics 
requirements for success within their country’s legal framework.  Law enforcers should also be 
provided with and trained to use equipment for the collection, preservation, analysis and 
interpretation of forensic evidence.  
The United States should provide greater financial and technological support for national, regional, 
and international efforts to (1) establish strong national criminal legislation against biological crimes, 
(2) train police to detect illicit biological activities, (3) enhance bio-forensic methods and capabilities, 
and (4) build cooperative relationships and information sharing networks between law enforcement 
and other key sectors and agencies (e.g. regulatory, public health, scientific). Equipment for sensing, 
sampling, and analyzing biological materials should be offered to organizations and States that can 
use it effectively. U.S. assistance with respect to biological crimes should be integrated with efforts 
to strengthen general law enforcement capabilities in recipient nations.    
The United States should promote the enhancement and make full use of the capabilities of Interpol, 
the 1540 Committee, and the BWC Implementation Support Unit to help strengthen national 
legislation and law enforcement capabilities against biological crimes. The United States should also 
promote effective synergies and coordination among these and other relevant entities, including the 
UN’s Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Office of Disarmament Affairs. 
Moreover, the United States should pursue, and provide assistance for, multilateral, regional and 
bilateral agreements, mechanisms and networks that promote international cooperation in the 
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investigation of suspicious biological activities and incidents. Such agreements should develop 
mechanisms and clarify standards for:   
• Coordinating investigations; 
• Collecting, analyzing and using forensic evidence; 
• Sharing and releasing information; 
• Protecting privacy, civil liberties, and confidential business information; 
• Assessing intelligence and other relevant information; 
• Effective attribution; and 
• Extradition and prosecution.  
 
INTERNATIONAL BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INVESTIGATIONS 
Recommendation 3: Support efforts to strengthen the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism for 
investigating allegations of biological weapons use and to establish a capability to 
investigate alleged breaches of BWC obligations if the Security Council determines that an 
investigation is warranted. 
The Problem 
The BWC outlaws the development, production and possession of biological and toxin weapons.  
Under Article VI of the Convention, any State Party may request that the UN Security Council 
consider a complaint that another State Party is acting in breach of its BWC obligations.  The ability 
of the Security Council to carry out investigations could facilitate the international resolution of such 
allegations, enhance the flexibility and policy options available to the Council, and help deter 
biological weapons proliferation.  However, substantial political and operational challenges confound 
any effort to investigate alleged violations of the BWC. Moreover, there is no standing international 
capability for conducting such investigations impartially and professionally.   
The UN Secretary-General does have the authority to investigate allegations of biological weapons 
use on his own initiative or at the request of the Security Council or a UN member State.  However, 
the Secretary-General lacks the resources needed to rapidly field an independent, qualified, trained 
and equipped team of investigators. Instead, the Secretary-General must rely on a hastily-
assembled team of experts provided by member states on an ad hoc basis. These experts are likely 
to have varying levels of training and expertise and no previous experience working together.  In 
several cases where investigations have been initiated by the Secretary-General, these problems 
have contributed to suboptimal performance, delays in response and the conduct of investigations, 
and concerns about quality and bias. 
Review and Assessment of Current Efforts 
In 2005, the bipartisan U.S. Task Force on the United Nations recommended establishing a new UN 
body that would train and administer a roster of biological weapons specialists to provide the 
Secretary-General and the Security Council with a standby investigation capability, and that would 
develop a manual to guide investigations. At the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC in 2006, 
States Parties invited the Security Council to utilize the Secretary-General’s existing mechanism to 
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investigate an allegation of biological weapons use if it deems that an investigation is warranted. The 
States Parties also reiterated their invitation to the Security Council to “initiate any measures it 
considers necessary” to investigate an alleged breach of the BWC. Earlier in 2006, the UN General 
Assembly encouraged the Secretary-General to update the nearly 20 year-old roster of experts and 
laboratories available on short notice and to update the technical guidelines and procedures for 
investigations of alleged use.  The UN updated the roster of experts in 2008, but little progress was 
made on updating the procedures because of the sovereignty concerns of some nations.  
Policy Recommendations 
The United States should undertake a high-level diplomatic initiative to build the consensus needed 
to (1) strengthen and regularly update the existing Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigating 
allegations of biological weapons use; and (2) secure a Security Council commitment to consider 
and, if warranted, authorize the investigation of alleged breaches of the BWC.  
The United States should work closely with the UN, other BWC States Parties, and Interpol to train a 
cadre of dedicated biological weapons investigators who are capable of investigating complaints of 
biological weapons use or a breach of BWC obligations.  Outstanding senior and experienced 
personnel should be recruited to comprise an international roster of respected professionals from the 
law enforcement, medical, scientific, legal, intelligence and military communities.  They should be 
trained to work together as teams and should operate under UN staff codes if called into action.     
Moreover, the United States should provide support for strategic, operational and logistical planning 
for investigations, and for updating the operational guidelines and procedures, including procedures 
for collecting, sharing, safeguarding and analyzing open-source and intelligence information during 
the conduct of an investigation. The United States should enhance and contribute its investigative 
capabilities, including technical and scientific resources, and should participate in an international 
network of validated reference laboratories.  The United States should also contribute to a UN 
reserve fund to support training activities and investigations.  
 
BIODEFENSE ACTIVITIES 
Recommendation 4: Pursue stronger confidence-building and other transparency measures 
designed to provide mutual reassurance that national biodefense and other dual-use 
activities comply with the BWC. 
The Problem 
Ongoing secrecy at some biological research facilities and expanding national biodefense activities 
in some countries continue to raise concerns about BWC compliance.  Several Russian biological 
research facilities remain closed to outsiders, and, although the Chinese have made tentative moves 
toward greater openness in recent years, Chinese intentions and activities also remain opaque. For 
its part, the U.S. government has expanded its biodefense efforts over the past decade, including 
projects that explore potential offensive applications of biological knowledge and technologies in 
order to guide the development of defensive countermeasures.  Some allies have expressed 
concern that these efforts could further blur the line between permitted and prohibited activities 
under the BWC.  Biodefense research and dual-use capabilities are also expanding in other nations. 
Every nation has the right to conduct biodefense research, but uncertainties about compliance and 
the direction of such research threaten to undermine the prohibition on biological weapons and to 
undercut the trust and cooperation on which global efforts to reduce biological threats rely. 
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Transparency, oversight and accountability are central to generating confidence in BWC compliance 
and maintaining the legitimacy of biodefense and other dual-use biological research. 
Review and Assessment of Current Efforts 
Today, the BWC Confidence-Building Measure (CBM) process is the only formal and potentially 
universal mechanism for increasing the transparency of biodefense-related activities.  BWC States 
Parties are politically but not legally bound to submit specific data about BWC-relevant activities on 
an annual basis.  Sixty-four States Parties (40%) made a CBM submission in 2007, nearly twice the 
lowest level of participation, which occurred in 2003.  Yet, many CBM submissions are incomplete or 
inaccurate.  More worrisome, the CBM process is losing relevance in the face of economic, political, 
scientific and technological changes since the reporting guidelines were last updated in 1991. 
Transparency can also be generated by activities that build cooperative relationships between 
people and institutions.  According to a study by the U.S. National Research Council (NRC), the 
Defense Department’s Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) has contributed to 
“unprecedented transparency” at dozens of important and previously closed facilities in the former 
Soviet Union and has provided important insights into the interests and intentions of foreign 
scientists.     
However, the long-term sustainability of these gains is in doubt. The BTRP and other threat 
reduction programs have largely disengaged from Russia because of concerns about continued 
Russian non-compliance with the BWC and lack of cooperation from Moscow. Increasing tensions 
between the United States and Russia in other spheres further cloud the prospects for cooperation. 
Yet, as the NRC study pointed out, “[t]here are considerable risks entailed in not participating in 
research engagement activities but instead simply remaining on the sidelines and speculating as to 
what may be taking place.” In addition, U.S. biological threat reduction programs continue to face 
difficulties aligning with the scientific and public health interests of partner nations, which generally 
revolve around naturally occurring infectious disease threats rather than bioterrorism. 
In the United States several agencies have established oversight mechanisms to ensure that the 
biodefense research they sponsor or conduct complies with the BWC.  However, these mechanisms 
are uneven in scope and application; no common guidelines are available for agencies to use when 
assessing compliance; and there is no established process for high-level, interagency oversight of 
activities that raise even the most significant BWC compliance concerns.  Moreover, U.S. agencies 
have not clearly communicated with outside audiences about their review processes, activities and 
intentions.  In spite of these problems, the United States is at the forefront of international efforts to 
establish national BWC compliance oversight arrangements.  Many other important nations lack 
comparable mechanisms, or any mechanisms at all. 
Policy Recommendations  
The United States should work to strengthen the BWC CBM regime by (1) promoting the use of the 
BWC Implementation Support Unit to provide assistance in assembling and submitting CBMs to 
those States Parties that request it; and (2) working with other nations to lay the groundwork for a 
thorough review and updating of the CBM mechanism at the BWC’s Seventh Review Conference in 
2011. During this review, the United States should advocate the development of new CBMs to 
address such issues as biological agent aerosolization activities, research that could enhance the 
weapons potential of biological agents, processes for BWC compliance review, and States Parties’ 
activities to promote the education of life scientists about dual-use research and the BWC. Finally, 
the United States should promote the establishment of a mechanism for periodically reviewing the 
substance and implementation of the CBM declaration requirements. 
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In some cases, additional confidence-building efforts are necessary. Sustained efforts should be 
made to engage both Russia and China on biodefense and other dual-use issues.  The United 
States should increase funding for biological threat reduction programs and transition them from 
programs of U.S.-directed assistance to programs that build true partnerships and scientific 
collaborations around common public health and research interests. Biological threat-reduction 
programs should also expand globally and, as they do, should be better aligned and integrated with 
the public health and life science research needs, priorities and strategies of partner nations.  The 
United States should also promote more international biodefense partnerships and personnel 
exchanges, which should extend even to biological threat assessment activities. 
Finally, the United States should begin to engage other nations in discussions concerning the 
development of common principles for national oversight and communication of biodefense research 
activities to ensure and demonstrate their full compliance with the BWC.  The United States should 
also establish a mechanism for sustained high-level interagency assessment and oversight of its 
biodefense programs.   
 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE 
Recommendation 5: Strengthen cooperative efforts to improve national, regional, and 
multinational surveillance and response capabilities with respect to outbreaks of infectious 
diseases, whether naturally occurring or man-made.  
The Problem 
Efforts to prevent the emergence of naturally occurring epidemics, laboratory accidents, or 
malevolent uses of microbes will not always succeed. The earlier an infectious disease event is 
detected, and the more robust and effective the ensuing response, the more resilient a society will 
be against infectious diseases. Improving surveillance and response capacities contributes to 
reducing biological threats, whether from natural disease outbreaks, laboratory accidents or 
biological weapons use. 
At present, infectious disease surveillance and response capabilities at the national, regional, and 
international levels are fragmented, uneven, and inadequately funded and staffed. Strategies to 
bolster global surveillance and response capabilities have suffered from variable political interest 
and commitment, and from disagreements between developed and developing countries about 
policy priorities (e.g. bioterrorism versus naturally occurring infectious diseases) and about secure 
and affordable access to vaccines and other health technologies.  
Review and Assessment of Current Efforts 
Efforts to strengthen surveillance and response capabilities against infectious disease threats have 
been underway in the United States and internationally since the emergence in the mid-1990s of 
fears about bioterrorism and the global crisis in emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. 
Infectious disease crises have accelerated these efforts, as witnessed by the impact of the 2001 
anthrax attacks in the United States, the global SARS outbreak in 2003, the international fears about 
the spread of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), and the on-going concern about 
avian influenza and the potential for a human influenza pandemic.   
The United States has initiated and/or supported efforts to strengthen national, regional, multilateral, 
and global surveillance and response capabilities, such as the IHR 2005, the National 
Biosurveillance Integration System at the Department of Homeland Security, and the WHO’s Global 
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Outbreak Alert and Response Network. Advances in information technologies have bolstered efforts 
to improve national and global surveillance systems.  
Despite this progress, serious problems remain. Surveillance systems remain inadequate and 
vulnerable to competing political and fiscal priorities. Surveillance systems for animal health and 
human health are inadequately coordinated and integrated, despite the threat from zoonotic 
diseases like SARS and avian influenza. And surveillance improvements in developing countries lag 
behind those of most developed countries. Meanwhile, national and global attempts to bolster 
response capacities are even further behind, particularly in developing countries.  The imbalance 
between surveillance and response capabilities will be debilitating in the short- and long-term, 
whatever the origin of the pathogenic threat. 
The IHR 2005 require all WHO Member States to develop and maintain core national surveillance 
and response capabilities, but plausible strategies for achieving and funding developing country 
compliance with these international legal obligations have not materialized. Moreover, as revealed 
by the controversy over Indonesia’s decision not to share samples of the H5N1 influenza virus with 
the WHO, developing countries are becoming increasingly intolerant of approaches to global disease 
surveillance that mainly benefit developed countries with their greater capabilities to respond to 
infectious disease threats. Instead, developing countries may seek increased support for 
surveillance capabilities that more closely reflect their national priorities and place greater emphasis 
on strengthening national and local public health and health care response capabilities. 
Policy Recommendations 
Given the global nature of the threats posed by biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious 
diseases, “weak links” in surveillance networks and response systems threaten the health of all 
nations, as well as global cooperation. The United States must work closely with other countries and 
the WHO to close three critical gaps: (1) the gap between rapid progress on infectious disease 
surveillance and lagging improvement in response capacities; (2) the gap between surveillance 
capabilities in developed and developing countries; and (3) the gap between response capacities in 
developed and developing countries. 
To address these gaps, more attention must be paid to naturally occurring infectious diseases and 
the common threats they pose to developed and developing nations. Many developing countries 
perceive the United States as interested only in protecting itself from the threats of bioterrorism and 
natural outbreaks of infectious disease. This perception damages prospects for achieving the kinds 
of improvements in surveillance and response systems that are required in today’s highly 
interdependent world.  
To enhance national, regional, and multilateral efforts to improve public health surveillance and 
response capabilities, the United States should:  
• Deliver increased capacity-building assistance for IHR 2005 implementation, consistent 
with development principles stressing the importance of local ownership, priority setting, 
and strategy formulation; 
• Realign the State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement Program and other biological 
threat reduction programs to better support the infectious disease surveillance and 
response priorities of the countries with which they engage; 
• Encourage stronger commitment from regional organizations for initiatives on regional 
improvements to infectious disease surveillance and response capacities; 
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• Develop a high-level initiative among leading developed and developing countries (e.g., 
European Union, Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) to advance coordinated 
efforts to ensure effective implementation of the IHR 2005 core capacity requirements for 
surveillance and response by the June 2012 deadline; and 
• Integrate the need to improve global health surveillance and response into the National 
Health Security Strategy being developed pursuant to congressional legislation. 
 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION 
Recommendation 6: Support the development of international mechanisms that enhance the 
coordination and implementation of biological threat reduction policies.  
The Problem  
Reducing biological threats is the shared responsibility of many sectors - government (e.g., health, 
security, law enforcement, intelligence), scientific, and private. Numerous actors, from the local to 
the international, must undertake threat reduction activities, and they must do so in relative harmony 
if such efforts are to be broadly effective. Disparate agencies and communities will not, on their own, 
be able to reach across their different perspectives to harmonize and integrate their missions and 
activities. Yet, effective mechanisms for supporting the coordination of biological threat reduction 
policies and efforts globally do not currently exist. As a result, threat reduction policies and efforts 
lack sufficient direction, commitment and follow-up from governments and other actors. Capabilities 
and resources are being fragmented and strained, particularly in developing nations, without 
producing substantive or sustainable progress.  
Review and Assessment of Current Efforts 
Approximately 30 international organizations are engaged in activities that are relevant to reducing 
biological threats. Each organization has a demarcated mandate and its own separate bureaucracy 
and agenda, and each devotes specialized expertise to carrying out distinct aspects of the biological 
threat reduction enterprise. But the efforts of these organizations are insufficiently coordinated to 
produce an optimal effort against biological threats. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
noted in Uniting Against Terrorism, “[t]hese efforts are to be applauded but, unless they are brought 
together, their effects will be diffuse. What we need now is … [to] bring together the various 
stakeholders - Governments, industry, science, public health, security, the public writ large - into a 
common programme, built from the bottom up, to ensure that biotechnology's advances are used for 
the public good and that the benefits are shared equitably around the world.” 
Policy Recommendations 
The United States should support the establishment of a coordinating mechanism for biological 
threat reduction within the UN, either as a committee created by the Security Council (e.g., like the 
1540 Committee) or through a joint commission created by the General Assembly (e.g., like the 
Disarmament Commission or International Law Commission). The UN represents the best venue for 
a new coordinating platform that can synchronize global strategies to reduce biological threats.  It 
has the necessary international legitimacy for the effort to take root and prosper. It can engage the 
many sectors that must be involved in reducing the threat from biological agents and can encourage 
institutional coordination among government bodies, universities, research centers, NGOs, and 
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private companies. In addition, the UN is well placed to ensure that developed and developing 
country interests are represented in multilateral biosecurity initiatives coordinated under its auspices.   
The U.S. government should support initiatives that can contribute to the establishment and growth 
of a UN coordinating mechanism as part of a broader effort to help improve coordination for 
biological threat reduction. In particular, in cooperation with its OECD partners, the United States 
should directly engage the private sector in discussions of the biosecurity implications, both positive 
and negative, of advances in biotechnology and of mechanisms for advancing global biosecurity 
while facilitating scientific innovation.  The United States should also actively support UN efforts to 
convene a global forum on biotechnology that brings together governments, academia, civil society 
and the private sector, as proposed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2006 and now 
being developed in a slightly different form by the current Secretary-General, Ban-Ki Moon. 
Recently, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism called for the 
establishment of formal and informal mechanisms for sustained dialogue among all stakeholders.  
An essential component of these efforts should be to identify innovative, flexible, and voluntary 
approaches to complement and supplement regulatory and legislative approaches. Finally, the 
United States should also strongly support efforts to enhance coordination of biological threat 
reduction efforts through the BWC and the IHR 2005. 
